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INTRODUCTION 
Automation is increasingly finding its way into the aircraft 
~ockp:Lt. To 3. certain extent, the aircraft will soon be able to 
almost fly itself. This trend leads one to question the role of 
the p:Llot in semi-automated and automated 3.ircraft. 
If computer technology becomes capable of com"plete 
autom3.tion of the pilot's task and, if the chance of system 
failure is absolutely zero, then aircraft pilots can eventually 
be eliminated. However, it is unlikely that a fail-safe system 
will be produced, except perhaps in the distant future. ~~rther, 
even if the system was fail-safe, the public might not be T!Tilling 
to fly on an aircraft without a pilot. Thus, for quite some 
time, there will be pilots in the cockpit. 
What role should the pilot fill in the cockpit of the 
future? One possibility is to have him perfor~ all those tasks 
that cannot as yet be automated. Unfortunately, this may lead to 
his having only an incoherent set of bits and pieces of tasks to 
perform. Also, the workload level may be so Imv that the "pilot 
becomes bored and his performance degrades. 
Boredom and performance degradation become especially 
important '!Then pilot T!Torkload suddenly becomes very high due to 
an emergency such as a failure of the computer system. If the 
pilot has not been involved with flying the aircraft, how can he 
be expected to suddenly take over the decision making from the 
computer? Thus, an issue that arises concerns how involved with 
. ' 
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the syste~ the pilot has to be to assure acceptable performance 
on his part during an emergency. 
Further, if one of the pilot's main tasks is to maintain 
himself so as to be able to acceptably respond to unforeseen 
situations, then it is interesting to consider the pilot's 
ability to detect such situations, diagnose their causes, and 
take appropriate actions. Also, the complexity of a highly 
automated and tightly integrated air traffic system may re~uire 
that the pilot respond ~uickly and flexibly to a wide range of 
situations, the number of which may be so large as to prohibit 
rote responses. 
This report summarizes the results of a six-year program of 
research which addressed the issues noted above. Each research 
project within this program is reviewed ~uite briefly. The 
interested reader can find complete treatments of these projects 
in the referenced papers and reports . 
r ' 
fl-
C 
1, 
( , 
\ 
Page 3 
COiIPu'rER-AIDED MULTI-TASK DECISION [vIAKING 
~l~he decision making tasks to be performed in flight 
management can be divided into three categories: 
1 • Those decisions which creiN' members must make, 
2. Those decisions which the computer must make, 
3. Those decisions that either crew members or the computer 
could make. 
',Vi th :i.ncreasing sophistication. of cO'llpute:r technology, the thi rd 
category of decision making tasks is becoming larger and larger. 
This is the type of tasks to 'N'hich we chose to address our 
research. 
In consid.ering this proble!Il, tN'e chose the criterion of 
trying to minimize the delay in successful completion of all 
tasks while also maintaining the cre'rf's workload at a level 
conduoive to their responding appropriately to unusual events. 
ie defined workload as the fraction of time that the crew is 
busy, as opposed to time spent scanning or involved in non-system 
relatE~d tasks. lfuile this definition is rather sim9l istic , it 
does confor~ with classical time-line analysis approaches. 
Further, fraction of time busy would certainly be an attribute of 
any more elaborate workload formulations. 
In order to be able to predict the impact of any specific 
allocation of tasks betw~en crew and computer, one needs a model 
of crew decision making in fl:i.ght management. '.rhis mod.el must 
allow one to describe both humans and computers in similar terms. 
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To this end, ~iTe decided to viei!, the human as a ti:ne-shared 
computer . Considering the literature on analysis of ti:ne-shared 
computer systems, it is immediately apparent that ~ queueing 
theory formulation is appropriate. Thus, we modeled human 
decision making as a preemptive priority queueing system. It is 
a priority system in that some tasks are more important than 
others. It is preemptive in that some tasks (e.g., an autopilot 
malfunction) require immediate attention and thus, when they 
occur, are allowed to "go to the head of the line" from a 
queueing perspective. 
With such a model, we used simulation to study alternative 
approaches to allocating tasks [Rouse, 1977J. It soon became 
apparent that system performance could only be optimized if one 
avoided a strict allocation of functions bet':iTeen human and 
computer. Instead, tasks should be assigned to the decision 
maker (human or computer) 'iTho is, at the '!loment, most capable of 
performing the task. These results led us to the conclusion that 
task allocation should be d.ynamic and adapt to time-varying 
aspects of the environment. 
But, how should task allocation adapt to the situation? 
Resorting again to the literature of queueing theory, we we~e 
able to extend some available results to obtain the conclusion 
that a fairly Simple scheme was appropriate. ~amely, the second 
decision maker (the computer) should be utilized whenever the su~ 
of the number of tasks to be pe~formed, 'iTeighted by the ~elati\Te 
importance of each task, exceeded a threshold. The threshold can 
r' 
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be determined analytically for some special cases or, via 
si~ulation for more general cases. The opti~al value of the 
threshold was found to depend on the number of tasks, arrival 
rates of tasks, and service rates of tasks [Chu and Rouse, 1977; 
Chu, 1978]. 
\'/i th the task allocation problem fo rmulated, the next step 
was to obtain empirical human decision making data. A flight 
management scenario was developed rRouse, Chu, and ~/val::len, 19'76]. 
Using this scenario, our first experi~ent produced verification 
that a queueing model of human decision making 
while also providing estimates of service 
probabili ties ['walden, 1977; (,valden and Rouse, 
';las appropriate 
rates and error 
1 977, 1 978] . 
i,ii th this data, T,ofe TITere able to esti"D.ate threshold values as 
a function of task arrival rates. This led to our second 
experiment which considered the effects of having the computer as 
a backup d.ecision maker. Both objective perfor"D.ance measur03S as 
well as subjective ratings were measured. It was found that the 
allocation policy mentioned above produced significant 
improvements in system performance and was also well-accepted by 
the subjects in the expertment. Further, the queueing model 
provided a reasonable description of human performance, even to 
the extent that the workload predictions of the model and the 
subjective ratings of subjects were highly correlated. T~us, the 
model may be useful for predicting levels of workload in a 
variety of multi-task situations [Chu, 1978; Chu and Rouse, 
1978,1979]. 
f • 
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~fuile our 'lueueing model is fairly good at describing hm>T 
!D.u()h ti..:ne the human spends in performing various tasks and 
predicting the total workload, the model says nothing about how 
the human detects that tasks must be performed or about how 'flell 
the tasks are performed. Thus, two other efforts ':vere directed 
at these issues. 
To consider event detection, we developed a process 
monitoring scenario where subjects had to indicate whether or not 
they thought a dynamic process had changed characteristics [Rouse 
and Greenstein, 1976aJ. Recognizing that many such tasks would 
not fit a linear gaussian systems for~ulation, we avoided an 
estimation and control theory construct. Instead, we developed a 
model based on feature extraction approaches of pattern 
recognition [Rouse and Greenstein, 1976bJ. Our first experiment 
yielded results that compared 'luite favorably with the model 
[Greenstein and Rouse, 1978 J . 
Our second experiment focused on. the joint problem of event 
detection and attention allocation. In this experiment, subjects 
had to trade-off detected probabilities of failures, times to 
implement actions, and costs of delaying actions in order to 
reach an allocation decision. Using 1ueueing theory, two models 
of attention allocation Ivere developed. :Jne model employed a 
very simple rule to rank order processes for servicing waile the 
other model involved a more global optimizationolmile both 
models compared ~ui te favorably 'I'li th human perfor-:nance, it 'tlas 
somewhat surprising to find that the simpler model actually 
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j produced the most favorable comparisons' [Greenstein, 1979a; 
i. 
Greenstein and Rouse, 1979, 1980]. 
This modeling effort has <].uite a few i:nplications 
[3-reenstein, 1979b]. \tfuile instrument scanning is one area of 
application, the feature extraction approach is also amenable to 
modeling how air traffic controllers detect deviations of 
aircraft from commanded trajectories. Considering aircraft with 
cockpit 1isplay of traffic information systems, the model appears 
to be applicable to describing the human's ability to detect 
changes in the behavior of neighboring aircraft and subsequently 
allocate increased attention to them. 
As noted earlier, our queueing theory llodel of hU!Il.an 
decision making in flight manage~ent is satisfactory for 
predicting how much time the human devotes to each task. 
However, the model only considers performance metrics in terms of 
probabili ty' of task completion. This is not completely 
satisfactory for control tasks 'N'here Rr~S deviations are also 
impo r.tant. Thus, given the <].ueueing model's pr edict ion of the 
fraction of time (if any) which th.e human will spend controlling, 
one would like to predict the control task performance. 
One approach to this problem would be to use conventional 
models of control task performance that include fractions of 
attention as free para!Il.eters. The main difficulty with this 
approach is that available models are based on the assumption 
that the human controls continuously lf1hile, in our flight 
management experiments, this is clearly an unreasonable 
, •• J 
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assumption. Thus, one needs a model. that allorNs for intermi ttent 
control actions and also provides a tight link with the overall 
queueing theory formulation. 
To approach this problem, we initially developed a simple 
heuristic model [Govindaraj and Rouse, 1978]. This model assumes 
that the human calculates a decision function using a weighted 
difference between a displayed map and the extrapolated aircraft 
trajectory. If this decision function exceeds a threshold, the 
aileron control is held at a m~imum value until the maximum bank 
angle is reached. If the decision function is rNi thin the 
threshold, the aileron is moved so as to return the bank angle to 
zero. 
A simulation experiment was conducted with this model to 
determine its sensitivity to the aircraft dynamics, 
characteristics of the map, and the model parameters (weighting 
function and threshold). Several interesting results were 
obtained, especially the fact that the model became unstable 
under conditions similar to those which cause naive subjects to 
become unstable controllers. 
',vhile this model looked promising, rNe ;Nanted to obtain '3. 
more analytical formulation. Thus, we returned to looking at 
optimal control formulations. First, we solved the opti~al 
preview control problem for deterministic paths (i-.e., maps) '3.nd 
then, ~oncentrated on determining how to incorporate discrete 
events. This effort led to the following formulation. 
\.' 
r . 
i." . 
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'tii thin an optimal control fo rmulation, we employed a 
quadratic cost functional that included weighting on errors (Q) 
and weighting on control effort (R). Scheduling a discrete event 
amounts to deter'llining the optimal time to make R/Q very large. 
This is due to the fact that making R/Q very large will result in 
very small ( effectively ze ro) control gains and also, INi 11 
compensate by exerting increased control when the gains are 
non-zero (i.e., normal RiO). Thus, our problem was considerably 
simplified. 
values of 
We developed a procedure for optimally placing large 
Rio based on a moving window of minimal values of 
absolute control rate. Comparing this model with human 
per'for"'D.ance resulted in substantially more favorable comparisons 
than were possible with the earlier heuristic model [Govindaraj, 
1979; Govindaraj and Rouse, 1979a,b, 1981]. 
More recently, our efforts were devoted to integrating the 
above work ~Ni th Chu, Govindaraj, Greenstein, and itialden into a 
coherent framew·ork. This revl.ew effort included surveying a ',vide 
range of models and empirical results and producing a 
comprehensive review. As a result of this review, a framework 
was developed within which human-co'll.puter interaction in dynamic 
systems in general can be viewed [Rouse, 1981]. 
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CO[vIPUTER-AIDED PROBLEM SOLVING 
:tli thin our research in fl ight management, we also have 
become 'concerned with the human's role as a problem solver in 
advanced automated aircraft. While we initially stressed 
trouble-shooting of failures in aircraft systems (e.g., hy·1raulic 
system), we have now come to also emphasize problem solving in 
terms of emergency and abnormal procedures. 
We first developed a trouble-shooting task which abstractly 
represented what the crew might have to do when diagnosing the 
failure of one of their systems. After two experiments [Rouse, 
1978a], we developed a model of hUman fault diagnosis abilities 
based on a few pattern-evoked heuristics as well as concepts from 
the theory of fuzzy sets [Rouse, 1978b]. 
The model offered a very succinct description of human 
'performance and motivated some display design notions as well as 
ideas for how the trouble-shooting task might be extended to 
match reality more closely. However, among many colleagues there 
was a consensus that crews will do very little airborne 
trouble-shooting of their systems. Notable exceptions to this 
consensus were two individuals in industry who felt that the crew 
should diagnose failures as well as possible while in the air to 
avoid excess turnaround time iflhile the aircraft is on the ground. 
This type of feedback led us to seek and receive support from 
another agency for the trouble-shooting work which we directed a.t 
the training of flight mechanics. 
I. 
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Starting in 1978, we began to look at the hu~an as a problem 
solver in a more general sense. As a framework for pursuing this 
topic, we ~lpent so~e ti~e contrasting flight manage~ent wi th more 
conventional management domains. \ve concluded that an essential 
issue in the design of on-board flight management information 
systems i::! an understanding of crew members as information 
seekers [Rouse and Neubauer, 1978J. 
Pursutng this issue further, we considered the areas in 
which the orew can realistically be said to be solving management 
problems. We concluded that the pilot is a manager in the sense 
that he m.anages the aircraft's internal (l1orld so as to meet the 
demands of the external world. In other words, the pilot is a 
manager (Le., problem solver and decision maker) who is 
responsiblE~ for what happens inside the aircraft [Rouse, 1978cJ. 
This realization led us to turn our attention to the 
internal world of the aircraft. In this way, we became 
interested in aircraft systems (i.e., electrical, hydraulic, 
etc. ) and!, in particular, emergency and abnormal procedures. 
Thes€~ interests have caused us to focus on infor':D.ation seeking 
behavior rE~lated to emergency and abnormal procedures. 
Studytng this problem, three issues struck us. Fi rst, the 
huge loose·oleaf notebooks in which these procedures are contained 
see~ very difficult to work with. Second, the procedures are 
mostly in text rather than graphical form. Thus, the crew 
membeirs have to transform a spatially ori.ented set of SY1lptOlllS to 
a non-spatially oriented text presentation and then, back to a 
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spatially oriented set of actions. Third, the procedures are 
highly "proceduralized" and seem to allow little room fo I' 
innovation should a totally unexpected and unanticipated event 
occur. 
In 1979, we initiated study of two of these issues. One 
study considered the use of color graphics for representing 
procedural information. ~~o experiments considered the effect of 
various coding schemes on the human's ability to perceive 
relationships in a schematic representation of a system. We were 
somewhat surprised to find that color coding did not produce 
significantly better performance once subjects ~t1ere fully trained 
[Neubauer and Rouse, 1979J. 
A second effort in this area led to the development of a 
task scenario for studying the effects of alternative approaches 
for retrieving and displaying procedural information. A first 
experiment evaluated hardcopy, softcopy, and intelligent softcopy 
manuals [Rouse and Rouse, 1980J. The manuals were abstractions 
of 747 emergency procedures. It was found that the additional 
features of an intelligent softcopy manual were necessary if 
computer-based manuals were to be clearly superior to hardcopy 
manuals. 
These results demonstrated that an appropriately designed 
computer-based information system couli produce SUbstantial 
benefits. This led us to design and develop a more complete 
information system concept for implementation and evaluation in 
our GAT-II simulator [Rouse, Rouse, and Hammer, 1980]. 
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Preliminary experiments were performed and the results indicated 
the superiority of the computer-based system in terms of 
lessening the frequency of serious pilot errors. This study also 
led to several changes in the computer-based system. 
A full··scale experimental evaluation of the system was then 
conducted utilizing four two-person crews flying nor~al, 
emergemcy, and double-emergency full-mission scenarios wi th 
ei ther hard.copy or computer-based information systems. The 
essential features of the computer aiding included: 
1. Automatic cross-referencing among 
returning from cross-references, 
procedures, includ.ing 
2. Automatic "dimming" of procedure steps that the computer 
could detect to be completed (68~ of all steps), 
3. Automatic reminders of 
intentionally skipped. 
procedural steps 
The results of this study indicated that a 
that 'llere 
well-d.esigned 
computer-based system can virtually eliminate certain classes of 
human errors [Rouse and Rouse, 1981]. 
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PLANNING AND PROBLEM SOLVING BEHAVIOR 
In 1978, we reviewed the literature of man-machine systems 
as it related to modeling man-machine interaction in 
realistically complex tasks [Johannsen and Rouse, 1978, 1979]. ~ 
At that time, we concluded that planning constituted a 
particularly important aspect of human problem solving behavior 
that had received relatively little attention from those who 
pursue human factors issues in systems design. For example, 
while everyone seems to agree that a map display or cockpit 
display of traffic information will impact the flight crew's 
planning process, it is difficult to empirically support this 
hypothesis. The main reason for this difficulty is that we 
really do not know how to measure planning. 
With this background in mind, we set out to study the 
planning process in flight management. This began with the 
notion of depth of planning. By depth, we mean level of detail 
which can range from broad and sketchy to specific and concrete. 
Our hypothesis was that planning with respect to a particular 
task need not be very deep if: 1) The amount of time until the 
task must be performed is large; 2) It appears that the 
environment will be "hospitable" to successfully completing the 
task; 3) The task is not critical to mission success. However, 
if one or more of these conditions ceases to hold, then iepth of 
planning will increase to the extent that the conditions ~re not 
satisfied. In o~her words, the iepth of planning associated with 
a particular task will be very great if the task must be 
'. 
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performed immediately, may be difficult to accomplish, and is 
critical to mission success. 
~ro stu.dy this hypothesis, an HFE 320 Ransa Jet simulator at 
the Hesearch Institute for Human Engineering in the F9deral 
Republic of Germany was employed. The HFE 320 is a t'N'elve 
passenger, twin engine jet used for both military and commercial 
purposes. It normally has a two-man crew. Using this simulator, 
two experiments were performed using nine professional HFE 320 
pilots who flew several 20 to 32 minute missions from cruise to 
touchdown, in some cases including several cycles of a holding 
pattern. 
Three flight conditions were studied: 1 ) normal, 2) 
abnormal involving possible cliversion to another airport because 
of snow or fog and reduced visibility, 3) emergency involving an 
unexpected engine failure or complete loss of hydraulic pressure 
or both. :::everal online !luestionnaire techniQues were used to 
assess a pilot's depth of planning during each of the flights. 
Besides thi.s subjective data, numerous objective measurements 
were also collected. 
'rhe rEtsults of the first experiment [Johannsen' and Rouse, 
1980] were somewhat speculative but, nevertheless, indicated that 
conscious planning was most pronounced in abnornal situations, 
while normal situations followed the standard scripts and 
e~ergency situations relied on the use of highly learned 
procedures since time did not allow the luxury of planning. 
Further, there appeared to be substantial differences between th~ 
planning processes of different pilots. 
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The second experiment [Johannsen and Rouse, 1981] involved a 
factorial study of scenarios (i.e., normal, abnormal, and 
emergency), flight phases (e.g., initial approach, final 
approach, and landing), and level of automation (i.e., manual and 
autopilot). Depth of planning, subjective workload, and flight 
performance were measured. Although, there were numerous 
results, only two were somewhat counterintuitive and deserve 
mention. 
First, it was found that the autopilot mode during abnormal 
scenarios reduced planning while the autopilot mode during 
emergency sc enarios increase.d planning. Fortunately, this 
surprising result was explainable. It was noted above that the 
abnormal scenarios involved events outside of the aircraft (i.e., 
runway closures) while the emergency scenarios involved events 
inside the aircraft (i.e., engine and hydraulic system failures). 
linen the runway is closed, the pilot's main task is holding and 
waiting unless, of course, the delay becomes excessive. ifuen the 
autopilot is available, the pilot's main task is automated a.nd 
thus, the need to pian is lessened and planning decreases. 
On the other hand, during emergencies the pilot's task 
involves controlling the aircraft and dealing with the engine 
and/or hydraulic system failure. In this case, if the a.utopilot 
takes over the control task, the pilot is freed to pl:3.n ~.;i th 
respect to the implications of the failure and hence, planning is 
increased. Thus, the effects of automation are subtle ~nd 
dependent· on the nature of events. 
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The second surprising result involves the correlation of 
subjective assessment of workload with 
flight performance. As might be expected, 
correlated with the level of control 
planning activity ~nd 
workload was highly 
activity necessary to 
maintain ai.rcraft altitude and attitude. However, workload was 
uncorrelated with level of planning activity. Thus, it appears 
that pilotsl do not perceive an increase i.n workload due to the 
increased planning necessary to cope with abnor~al or emergency 
events. This may be due to the fact that planning is an internal 
process rather than an external activity. 
;fuile the above HFB 320 experiments have provided 
interesting insights into planning as it is affected by numerous 
varia.bles, these types of experi~ent present two particular 
problems. First, they are very time~consuming to design, 
develop, and execute. Second, the amount of data resulting is 
aLmost overwhelming even when only a few subjects are utilized. 
For these reasons, we decided to create a si~plified problem 
solving environment to be used as a complement to the robust 
flight tasks possible 111i thin the HFB 320. The result-lias a task 
called PLANT (Production Levels and Network Troubleshooting) 
which was clesigned to include aspects of problem solving that are 
typical in flight environments but, at the same ti:ne, simple 
enough to allow subjects to learn the basics of the task quickly 
and thereby enable us to establish a large subject pool. 
PLANT is basically a large set of tanks interconnected by 
valves that may be opened or closed. Fluid, the pr-oduct 0= 
PLAN'I~, flows between t-.fIO interconnected tanks in proportion to 
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the difference in the height of the fluid in each tank. The 
human's goal is to configure P1A~T by opening and/or closing 
valves so as to maximize the production of fluid (i.e., the total 
flow through the network per unit time) subject to the constraint 
that no tank become completely empty or full. This constraint 
leads to a tradeoff between optimization (i.e., maximizing 
production) and stabilization (i.e., staying safely within the 
limi ts of fluid levels). In addition, valves can fail '.vhich 
leads to closure of interconnections and fluid buildup. These 
failures must be detected, diagnosed, and corrected for the 
product to have the correct consistency. 
PLANT is somewhat analagous to flight management in that the 
initial portion of a production run involves configuring the 
network (i.e., takeoff) while the latter portion of the run 
involves monitoring the network (i.e., cruise). ~~rther, in the 
event of failures, reconfiguration may be necessary. In such 
si tuations, the human must cope 'IIi th three goals: optimiza t ion, 
stabilization, and detection/diagnosis. 
Two experiments were performed using PLANT. The fi rst 
experiment was a factorial study of network size and failure rate 
[Rouse and Morris, 1981a]. The second experiment was a factorial 
study of network size, failure rate, display noise levels, and 
time constraints [Rouse and MorriS, 1981b]. The most important 
conclusion of these studies ,,vas that the subjects appeared to 
have difficulty in coordinating the goals of optimization, 
stabilization, and detection/diagnosis. In particular, subjects 
tended to focus on diagnosis to the extent that production 
Ps.ge 19 
possibilities were severely compromised. (It is interesting to 
note that a similar type of focusing was found for some subjects 
in the GAT-II experiments noted s.bove.) This finding appears to 
have implications for the design of computer s.ids for 9.ssisting 
humans to coordinate tasks. 
.: 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The six-year program of research summarized in this report 
included fifteen formal experimental studies and the development 
of a variety of models of human behavior based on queueing 
theory, pattern recognition methods, control theory, fuzzy set 
theory, and artificial intelligence concepts. irnile these 
studies and models are important products of this research 
program, a more important product is the well-tested, 
automation-oriented design concepts that have emerged. In this 
final section, we will review these concepts. 
Our efforts in computer-aided multi-task decision making 
have shown that automation decisions need not be static. 
Instead, performance improvements can be gained if the use of 
automation is adaptive in that it is used when necessary but 
avoided when unnecessary. More specifically, automation is 
invoked when the crew's workload increases to the extent that 
they will not be able to successfully complete all necessary 
tasks. Otherwise, the crew perfor~s all of its normal functions. 
In this way, the crew maintains its skills while also having the 
advantages of automation when necessary. 
Our efforts in computer-aided proble~ solving have ShOTNU 
that automation can greatly aid the crew by performing the 
bookkeeping aspects of problem solving. In particular, the 
computer can help the crew by keeping track of ",qhat has been done 
and the implications of these actions. This type of automation 
can substantially reduce the frequency of human errors '.vhile 
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still leaving the crew with overall responsibility for the 
problem solving.' 
Our studies of planning and problem solving behavior have 
illustrated some of the subtle effects of automation, 
particularly in the planning studies, and indicated where 
automation could be helpful.' For example, the problem solving 
studies showed that performance could be improved if the human 
was aided in coordinating goals, especially in failure 
situations. This type of higher-level aid would be quite 
differ-ent from traditional aircraft automation. 
rro con.clude, this program of I"eseaI"ch has pI"oduced seveI"al 
'ITell-'t;ested concepts for using automation to aid crews in 
decision ma.king, problem solving, and planning. This work has 
shown the potential benefits to be gained by using automation to 
assist cre~~ rather than incrementally attempting to I"eplace the 
crew by automation. 
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